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Abstract: An increasing number of countries are reviewing their financial supervisory structures and 
show a trend of consolidation in financial supervision. Using a sample of 27 countries from European 
Union, we find that the dependent variables taken into consideration (Herfindahl-Hirschman index 
and share of the five largest credit institutions in total assets) have no significant effects on different 
types of supervisory integration. In addition, there aren’t any differences in the impact of distinct 
types of financial supervision even if the country is already an EU member or a candidate. 
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1. Introduction  
Nowadays the financial system and the financial supervision of the EU’s countries 
are much different from several decades ago. Many countries made important 
changes in the overall architecture, and even if the trend is of an integrated 
surveillance, different countries involve different financial supervision models, so 
there is no single optimal model. The increasing size and role of the financial 
sector has generated some advantages such as broader, cheaper and more 
accessible range of financial services in terms of efficiency, resource allocation and 
distribution channels (Arnone, Gambini, 2007). 
The main purpose of the central bankers, supervisors and government ministries is 
to deal with the threats of the stability of the financial system. Factors that 
influence financial reform are mainly technology, industry competition, increasing 
role of the capital market, financial innovations, increasing complexity of financial 
activity, globalization progress and financial crises. Considering all the factors 
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mentioned and not only, many states developed financial reforms in order to make 
the financial system more stable, competitive and transparent. 
The financial supervision is different from one European country to another due 
especially to financial system structure, history evolution, specific opportunities, 
political structure and traditions, country and financial sector size. The recent 
turmoil that shacked the global financial system, EU states were considering to re-
evaluate the architecture of the financial sector supervision. At this moment, many 
EU states (Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, 
Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Latvia, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Slovakia, Sweden, 
United Kingdom) have adopted the centralized model, the single supervisor being 
responsible for supervising and regulating all the segments of the financial sector 
(banking, securities market and insurance). Bulgaria and Luxembourg are 
characterized by a partial functional integration. In Bulgaria the banking system is 
supervised and regulated by Bulgarian National Bank and the securities and 
insurance market by Financial Supervision Commission; in Luxembourg, a single 
authority supervise both the banking sector and the securities market, while the 
insurance sector that has been left to the Commisariat aux Assurances. Sectoral 
approach is still in force in the rest of the countries (Cyprus, Greece, Italy, 
Lithuania, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia and Spain), in which the banking sector 
supervision is assigned to the central bank, securities market to the securities and 
exchange institution and insurance sector is regulated and supervised by a separate 
authority. 
In the literature (e.g. Cihak and Podpiera, 2008) distinguish different types of 
supervisory arrangements: some integrated supervisory agencies cover all the three 
main sectors – banking, insurance and securities - “full sectoral integration”; others 
cover only two of these sectors - “partial sectoral integration” and no sectoral 
integration. Each of them is classified as follows: full sectoral integration can be 
found in three forms – full sectoral and functional integration, twin peaks and full 
sectoral, partial functional integration; partial sectoral integration can be integrated 
supervision of banks and insurance companies, integrated supervision of banks and 
securities market, integrated supervision of insurance companies and securities 
market.  
On this financial field, in a continuously change of the structure and nature of 
banking, the degree of independence of banking competition becomes a debated 
subject. Especially during the last ten years, many empirical models have 
attempted to measure the existing level of competition in different European 
national banking markets, or in the European banking system as a whole. 
Considering the importance of the financial system in the economy, and in the 
same time the importance of banking competition (competition is a fundamental 
condition of the market economy and also is considered one of the most important 
factors for the economic progress), we directed our research to analyze the impact 
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of financial supervision on banking competition in EU countries with different 
financial supervision arrangements. Another reason for developed this article was 
that EU members are dealing with increasing integration of financial markets over 
the last and also with a change in the structure of their banking systems. 
The main contribution of this paper is that provides evidence about connection 
between financial supervision and banking competition in countries with different 
supervisory models. The results can be linked to banking markets development and 
also to the integration of banking business in EU. 
Our findings suggest that there aren’t significant differences on the main indicators 
of banking concentration in countries with different types of financial supervision. 
Also, there aren’t any differences in the impact of distinct types of financial 
supervision, even if the country is a new EU member or is an older one. 
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 consists of literature review. Section 
3 describes briefly the history, types and changes in the financial supervision 
arrangements in the European Union. Section 4 explains the data and the 
methodology used. Section 5 discusses the empirical results, while Section 6 
concludes. 
 
2. Literature Review 
In the literature there are numerous studies analysing the financial supervisory 
arrangements at national level, focusing on the model adopted in certain countries 
or realising comparisons between them, in order to highlight the differences and 
the consequences. Cihak and Podpiera (2008) found, on a sample of 84 countries, 
that supervisory integration is associated with higher quality of insurance and 
securities supervision and greater consistency of supervision across sectors, 
supporting in this sense the “twin peaks” model. They also found that whether 
supervision is located inside or outside the central bank has no significant relation 
to supervisory quality. Barth et al. (2002) using both country-specific data for 55 
countries in all parts of the world and data for over 2,300 individual banks in those 
countries, found a weak influence for the structure of supervision on bank 
performance, and in particular found some evidence that a single supervisor system 
enhances bank performance. Masciandaro (2004) emphasizes through a 
comparative analysis of 69 countries that an increase in the degree of concentration 
of supervisory powers is evident in the developed countries, and particularly in the 
European Union. In addition, he confirms a trade-off that emerges between the 
degree of financial sector unification and the role of the central bank. Masciandaro 
shows in another article (2007), on a dataset of 89 countries, that if the central bank 
involvement in supervision and its reputation are high, the unification level is 
likely to be low, and vice versa, confirming also the robustness of the central bank 
fragmentation effect. Pellegrina and Masciandaro (2008) showed that lower levels 
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of corruption, better institutional governance, and more efficient judicial systems, 
are associated with the choice of a single supervisor of financial markets. 
Masciandaro (2009) using a simple application of a general common agency game, 
sheds light on which conditions the politicians prefer when implementing unified 
sector supervision outside the central bank and on the other hand tests the model, 
confirming the robustness of the institutional position of the central bank in 
explaining the recent trend in supervision consolidation, with an empirical analysis. 
Monkiewicz (2007) argues that there are no ideal supervisory models and each 
jurisdiction has to find its own way. In doing so, it should always care for the 
preservation of the most critical properties of the supervisory system: its 
independence, accountability, transparency, integrity and market responsiveness. 
He concludes that in the present circumstances, the net benefits of adopting an 
integrated approach probably exceed the net benefits stemming from the adoption 
of a specialized approach for most of the countries in the region of Latin America 
and the Caribbean. 
Athanassiou (2006) states that in Cyprus is required to reform the financial system 
supervision and an integrated approach should be taken into account in future. In 
the same regard, Wymeersch (2007) makes a comparative analysis of the features 
of supervision models, giving indications about the drivers for choosing one of 
them and the pros and cons that have been advanced, describing the actual situation 
in each of the EU states.  
 
3. A Brief Review of European Union Financial Supervision 
At EU level there are many studies that approach the integrated supervision. 
Quaglia (2008) compare three states in terms of financial supervision, highlighting 
that United Kingdom and Germany have a high number of financial conglomerates, 
they have a large number of international financial operators, and they host the two 
main financial centers in Europe and for these reasons it was higher the incentive in 
favor of a single supervisor. On the other side, in Italy, the financial system 
remains relatively segmented, with a limited number of international operators, the 
incentive in favor of a single supervisor being smaller. Herring and Carmassi 
(2008) analyzing the changes in supervision architecture, emphasis on the 
integrated approach, and shows that crisis management by committee may not be 
an adequate substitute for the traditional model, in which prudential supervision is 
combined within the central bank.  
Alexander (2011), examines some of the institutional issues concerning the 
creation of the three EU Supervisory Authorities (ESAs), including the ESAs’ 
authority to develop an EU code of financial regulation and to oversee its 
implementation by member States and resolve related disputes. He suggest that the 
ultimate effectiveness of the supervisory reforms will depend on whether they 
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achieve a balance between crisis prevention supervisory measures and crisis 
management involving the rescue or resolution of financial firms and a better 
balance needs to be struck to achieve financial stability objectives. 
Cervellati and Fioriti (2007) describe the three main theoretical supervisory models 
proposed in the literature: vertical, horizontal, centralized and considering the 
actual supervisory systems are the result of the different legal frameworks of the 
member States and of the way in which their financial systems developed, they 
conclude and underline that differences that still exist among the EU systems make 
more difficult to achieve a real European integration in financial supervision. Also, 
Herring and Carmassi (2008) affirms that the most influential reorganization in 
financial supervision during the last decade took place in the United Kingdom, due 
to its role as a major international financial center. Damaestri and Guerrero (2005) 
concludes that in the case of the Scandinavian countries, the decisions to fully 
integrate financial regulation in a single institution were part of an evolutionary 
process, while in the recent cases the reform was implemented after holding a 
debate on the main advantages and costs of integration. Quaglia (2007) considers 
that intergovernmental dynamics largely account for the decision-making stage in 
which the national governments, especially the finance ministers of UK and 
Germany, were in the driving seat and had a major bearing on the outcome. He also 
underlines that different theories considered assign different influence to factors 
and actors at the global, EU and national levels, a combination of various 
approaches, helps to explain the multilevel governance of the financial services 
sector in the EU. 
Begg (2009) underlines that a supranational supervisory system is needed for some 
intermediaries, but that proximity to market actors at national level remains 
important and also analyzes the financial supervision in EU and underlines the fact 
that from a total of 27 countries, 14 have adopted a single financial regulator, as 
follows: the unified supervisor is separated from the central bank in 10 countries 
(Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Hungary, Latvia, Malta, Poland, Sweden, 
United Kingdom), while in the remain countries either the central bank is the single 
regulator (Czech Republic, Slovakia), the single regulator is an agency of the 
central bank (Ireland), or an independent agency affiliated with the central bank 
(Estonia). The rest of the 13 states adopted the following financial supervision 
schemes: six adopted the sectoral approach (Cyprus, Greece, Lithuania, Romania, 
Slovenia, Spain), three introduced an integrated, sectoral model (Bulgaria, Finland 
and Luxembourg), and three have combined regulation by sector with regulation by 
objectives (France, Italy and Portugal). Finally, the Netherlands follows the twin 
peaks model, with the central bank responsible for macro and micro prudential 
supervision.  
In EU countries, at this moment, the agencies responsible for supervising the three 
sectors - banking, insurance and securities market - are presented in Table 1. 
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Table 1. Supervisory institutions in European Union 
Country Banks Securities Insurance 
Austria Austrian Financial Market Authority 
Belgium Financial Services and Markets Authority 
Bulgaria 
Bulgarian National 
Bank 
Financial Supervision Commission 
 
Cyprus 
Central Bank of 
Cyprus 
Cyprus Securities and 
Exchange Commission 
Cyprus Insurance 
Companies Control Service 
Czech Rep. Czech National Bank 
Denmark Denmark Financial Supervisory Authority 
Estonia Finantsinspektsioon 
Finland Financial Supervisory Authority (FIN-FSA) 
France Autorité des marches financiers 
Germany Federal Financial Supervisory Authority (BaFin) 
Greece Bank of Greece 
Capital Markets 
Commission 
Directorate of Insurance 
undertakings and actuarial 
studies 
Hungary Hungarian Financial Supervisory Authority 
Ireland Central Bank of Ireland 
Italy Bank of Italy 
Companies and Stock 
Exchange Commission 
(CONSOB) 
Insurance Industry 
Regulatory Authority 
(ISVAP) 
Latvia Financial and Capital Markets Commission 
Lithuania Bank of Lithuania 
Lithuanian Securities 
Commission 
Insurance Supervisory 
Commission of the Republic 
of Lithuania 
Luxembourg Commission de Surveilance du Secteur Financier Commisariat aux Assurances 
Malta Malta Financial Services Authority 
Netherlands Netherlands Authority for the Financial Markets 
Poland Polish Financial Supervision Authority 
Portugal Banco de Portugal 
Portuguese Securities 
Market Commission 
Instituto de Seguros de 
Portugal 
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Romania 
National Bank of 
Romania 
National Securities 
Commission 
Insurance Supervisory 
Commission 
Slovakia National Bank of Slovakia 
Slovenia Bank of Slovenia Securities Market Agency 
Insurance Supervisory 
Agency 
Spain Bank of Spain 
Spanish Securities Market 
Commission 
Insurance sector regulator 
Sweden 
Swedish Financial Supervisory 
Authority 
United 
Kingdom 
FSA Financial Services 
Authority 
Source: own elaboration from Wymeersch (2007), websites of respective national bodies 
and http://www.cbfa.be/eng/links/li.asp 
 
European Union countries have adopted a variety of supervisory structures, but 
they followed that by integrating the different types of supervision, the quality and 
effectiveness of supervisory activity to be improved. The reasons for supporting 
integrated supervision are related to efficiency (unified standard setting and unified 
procedures, cost of supervision would be lowered, facilitate contacts by supervised 
entities), effectiveness, and the creation and rapid growth of financial 
conglomerates. On the other hand, in the literature (Wymeersch, 2007) were 
formulated different forms of criticism against the integrated supervisor model. 
Firstly, the integrated model serves the interest of the multi-service financial 
groups, but is of little interest to those financial firms that are not active in several 
segments of the financial market, especially the smaller ones. Secondly, the remark 
is made that by integrating all financial supervision in the hand of one single body, 
the latter becomes too big, too unmanageable and too powerful. Thirdly, an 
integrated supervisor has led some to fear moral hazard. Fourthly, there may even 
be some diseconomies of scale. Finally, if the objectives of the integrated 
supervisory agency are not clearly specified, it may be less effective than sectorial 
supervisory agencies. 
 
4. Data and Methodology 
Financial stability requires a good financial supervision, but the issue is whether 
integrated supervision is closely linked with higher quality of supervision, the 
theoretical literature being unclear on this point. Therefore, we formulate our 
research hypothesis as follows: countries with full integrated supervision have a 
higher and more even quality of supervision across sectors in European Union and 
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this impacts on banking competition. In the following, we provide an empirical 
examination of the hypothesis using data on a cross-section of the EU 27 countries. 
 
4.1. Data 
We have data on supervisory structures from the 27 economies from European 
Union. In our model, the vector of explanatory variables consists of the two factors 
from banking market concentration degree – share of the five largest credit 
institutions in total assets and Herfindahl-Hirschman Index for 2010. 
We chose to apply this model on European Union in order to underline the 
differences between EU’s member states from the point of financial supervisory 
regime and its consequences for the banking competition, if exists. Other reasons 
for selecting these countries are the common characteristics i.e. the same European 
directives that regulate the financial sector in order to develop the Single Market, 
and also the geographical proximity.  
Our contribution to the literature consists in selected several new indicators than 
the previous studies used, namely: share of the five largest credit institutions in 
total assets and Herfindahl-Hirschman Index. We took this form of indicators 
because they are relevant in underlining the impact of increase or decrease of the 
financial supervision’s impact in banking competition. 
 
4.2 Methodology 
We consider financial supervision unification our dependent variable. The first step 
is to construct this binary variable (1=fully integrated financial supervision and 0 
=all others) and the second one to define the logit model. Two popular versions are 
the probit and the logit model, and since in practice the predicted probabilities 
differ only slightly and the second one it is easier to use computationally than the 
first one, we opt for the logit model. The logit model is specified as: 
 
       
 
     
 
 
          
                                                                             (1) 
where P is the probability that Z takes the value 1 and F is the cumulative logistic 
probability function, X is the set of regressors and α and ᵝ and are parameters. It can 
be shown that the regression equation is equal to: 
   
 
   
                                                                                                  (2) 
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We estimate a binomial logit model using a set of determinants of degree of 
banking concentration, in order to answer the question of what probability different 
supervisory regimes have an impact on the banking competition in European 
Union. 
 
5. Empirical Results  
There are four qualitative characteristics of supervisory regimes that we decided 
not to consider in constructing the model: 1. the legal nature, public or private, of 
the supervisory institution nor their relationship to the political system, 2. degree of 
independence, 3. level of accountability, 4. the implication of the central bank in 
supervising the financial sector, because the financial literature proved the strong 
connection between the last mentioned. Moreover, we did not consider who is 
involved in the management of the deposit insurance schemes. In general, we 
consider only the three traditional sectors (banking, securities and insurance 
markets) that have been the subject of supervision. Finally, the financial authorities 
may perform different functions in the regulatory as well as in the supervisory area. 
However, at this stage of the institutional analysis, we consider only the number of 
the agencies involved in the supervisory activities. We consider that the dependent 
variable i.e. financial supervision unification is representative, in this case, 
considering only the supervisory activities without regulatory ones. The increase of 
public policy debates about institutional structure of regulation and supervision 
indicates that a certain unease about prevailing structures. International experience 
indicates a wide variety of institutional regulatory formats which suggests there is 
no universal ideal model, considers Llewellyn (2005). In the same direction, our 
results presented in Table 2 allow a number of conclusions. 
Table 2. Estimation results of the binomial logit model 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.  
Herfindahl – Hirschman 
Index 
0.000950 0.001243 0.763719 0.4450 
Share of the five largest 
credit institutions in total 
assets 
-0.008272 0.023182 -0.356838 0.7212 
Mean dependent var. 0.629630  S.D. dependent var 0.492103 
S.E. of regression 0.494913  Akaike info criterion 1.423754 
Sum squared resid. 6.123463  Schwarz criterion 1.519742 
Log likelihood -17.22068  Hannan-Quinn criterion 1.452296 
Deviance 34.44136  Restr. deviance 35.59424 
Avg. log likelihood -0.637803    
Obs. with Dep=0 10   Total obs. 27 
Ob.s with Dep=1 17    
     
Source: author’s calculations 
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We classified the supervisory regimes trying to underline the differences between 
them by number of the institutions involved: full integrated (single supervisor), 
partial integrated (at least one authority monitor for more than one sector) and 
sectoral (separate authorities foe each sector, at least one per sector). After this 
classification, we analyzed if the impact of different supervisory is significant for 
the two representative variables that we selected in the model, and we highlighted 
that none of the dependent variables influences the independent one. So, the null 
hypothesis isn’t rejected since, no variable isn’t statistically significant, meaning 
that the supervision arrangements have no significant effect on degree 
concentration of the banking system and also on the banking competition.  
The rejection of the hypothesis comes somewhat in contradiction with the general 
impression on the link between the type of supervision and the development level 
of the financial system from a country. This result supports previous studies, such 
as that of Cihak and Podpiera (2008), who emphasized that relation between the 
level of economic development and the integrated supervision is not statistically 
significant, the study of Masciandaro (2009), who outlined that wealth features of 
each country are insignificant, traditional market-based versus bank-based index 
shows no relationship with the choice of the supervisory model, and that the 
development of the financial markets, measured by the level of market 
capitalization, and the size of the banking system, measured by the asset dimension 
is also insignificant. 
 
6. Conclusions 
The objective of this paper has been to analyze how the type of financial 
supervision regime influences important indicators of the concentration degree in 
banking industry (Share of the 5 largest credit institutions in total assets and 
Herfindahl-Hirschman index), in order to underline the influences in banking 
competition. The results are included in the trend of literature that analyzed this 
type of connection: the supervisory function is being performed by a variety of 
institutions, but indifferently who is supervising the financial sector (one, two, 
three institutions), there is no significant influence on banking sector and on 
banking competition. From our point of view, this underlines the fact that changing 
the structure of the financial system does not guarantee better supervision or better 
indicators at the end of the year. Better supervision comes from stronger 
regulations and non-political implications. It is more important to accept that the 
institutional structure is not perfect and try to improve the regulations, than only to 
try to change the structure of the supervisory institutions.  
  
ACTA UNIVERSITATIS DANUBIUS                                          Vol 8, no. 6/2012 
 
 66 
7. Acknowledgement 
This work was supported by the project “Post-Doctoral Studies in Economics: 
training program for elite researchers – SPODE” co-funded from the European 
Social Fund through the Development of Human Resources Operational 
Programme 2007-2013, contract no. POSDRU/89/1.5/S/61755. 
 
8. References 
Alexander, K. (2011). Reforming European financial supervision: adapting EU institutions to market 
structures. ERA Forum. Journal of the Academy of European Law, Vol. 12, no. 2, pp. 229-252. 
Andrei, T., Bourbonnais, R. (2008). Econometrie/ Econometrics. Bucharest: Economica, pp. 322-328. 
Arnone, M., Gambini, A., 2007, Architecture of supervisory authorities and banking supervision. In: 
Masciandaro, D., Quintyn, M. (eds.), Designing Financial Supervision Institutions: Independence, 
Accountability and Governance. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, pp. 262-308. 
Athanassiou, P. (2006). Financial supervision in the Republic of Cyprus: the case for reform. Journal 
of Financial Regulation and Compliance, Vol. 14, no. 1, pp. 57-69. 
Barth, J.R., Nolle, D.E., Phumiwasana, T., Yago, G. (2002). A Cross-Country Analysis of the Bank 
Supervisory Framework and Bank Performance. Economic and Policy Analysis Working Paper. US 
Department of the Treasury. 
Begg, I. (2009). Regulation and Supervision of Financial Intermediaries in the EU: The Aftermath of 
the Financial Crisis. Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 47, no. 5, pp. 1107-1128. 
Cervellati, E.M., Fioriti, E. (2007). Financial Supervision in EU Countries. Social Science Research. 
Paper presented at EFMA annual meeting, Vienna, Austria.  
Cihak, M., Podpiera, R. (2008). Integrated financial supervision: Which model?. North American 
Journal of Economics and Finance, vol. 19, no. 2, pp. 135–152. 
Damaestri, E., Guerrero, F. (2005). Financial Supervision: Integrated or Specialized? The Case of 
Latin America and the Caribbean. Financial Markets, Institutions & Instruments, vol. 14, no. 2, pp. 
43-106. 
Herring, R. J., Carmassi, J. (2008). The Structure of Cross-Sector Financial Supervision. Financial 
Markets, Institutions & Instruments, Vol. 17, no. 1, pp. 51-76. 
Kern, A. (2011). Reforming European financial supervision: adapting EU institutions to market 
structures. ERA Forum, Vol. 12, no. 2, pp. 229-252. 
Llewellyn, D.T. (2005). Institutional structure of financial regulation and supervision: the basic 
issues. Aligning Financial Supervision Structures with Country Needs. Washington: World Bank 
Publication, pp. 19-85. 
Masciandaro, D. (2004). Unification in financial sector supervision: The trade-off between central 
bank and single authority. Journal of Financial Regulation and Compliance, Vol. 12, no. 2, pp. 151-
169. 
Masciandaro, D. (2007). Divide et impera: Financial supervision unification and central bank 
fragmentation effect. European Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 23, no. 2, pp. 285– 315. 
ŒCONOMICA 
 
 67 
Masciandaro, D. (2009). Politicians and financial supervision unification outside the central bank: 
Why do they do it?. Journal of Financial Stability, Vol. 5, no. 2, pp. 124–146. 
Monkiewicz, J. (2007). Integrated, Consolidated or Specialized Financial Markets Supervisors: Is 
there an Optimal Solution?. The Geneva Papers, no. 32, pp. 151-162. 
Pellegrina, L.D., Masciandaro, D. (2008). Politicians, central banks, and the shape of financial 
supervision architectures. Journal of Financial Regulation and Compliance, Vol. 16, no. 4, pp. 290-
317. 
Quaglia, L, (2007). The politics of financial services regulation and supervision reform in the 
European Union. European Journal of Political Research, Vol. 46, no. 2, pp. 269-290. 
Quaglia, L. (2008). Explaining the Reform of Banking Supervision in Europe: An Integrative 
Approach. Governance: An International Journal of Policy, Administration, and Institutions, Vol. 21, 
no. 3, pp. 439–463. 
Wymeersch, E. (2007). The structure of financial supervision in Europe: About single, twin peaks and 
multiple financial supervisors. European Business Organization Law Review, Vol. 8, no. 2, pp. 237–
306. 
  
